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a b s t r a c t
This paper analyzes empirically the effect of spatial agglomeration of activities on plant-level productiv-
ity, using French ﬁrm and plant-level data from 1996 to 2004. We exploit short-run variations of vari-
ables by making use of GMM estimation. This allows us to control for endogeneity biases that the
estimation of agglomeration economies typically encounters. This means that our paper focuses on a sub-
set of agglomeration economies, the short-run ones. Our results show that French plants beneﬁt from
localization economies, but we ﬁnd very little – if any – evidence of urbanization economies. We also
show that those localization beneﬁts are relatively well internalized by ﬁrms in their location choice:
we ﬁnd very little difference between the geography that would maximize productivity gains in the
short-run and the geography actually observed.
 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Aside from its academic interest, the analysis of agglomeration
economies has potentially important policy implications. Since the
1980s, agglomeration economies have been used to justify cluster
policies by national and local governments in Germany, Brazil,
Japan, Southern Korea, Spanish Basque country or more recently
in France. Some of those policies are very costly. For example, 1.5
billions euros have been devoted to the ‘‘Competitiveness clusters’’
policy by the French government from 2005 to 2008, and again
for the 2009–2011 period. Two separate questions deserve atten-
tion. First, how large are the gains from agglomeration? In partic-
ular, how much does the productivity of a ﬁrm increase when
other ﬁrms from the same sector or from another sector decide
to locate nearby? Second, how much do ﬁrms internalize these
gains when deciding where to locate? The answer to the ﬁrst ques-
tion should help understand how much economic gains can be ex-
pected from clusters. The answer to the second question should
help understand whether there is a strong case for public interven-
tion in favor of industrial clusters.1
Rosenthal and Strange (2004) survey this literature, and report
that the elasticity of productivity with respect to the size of the city
or to the size of the industry generally lies between 3% and 8%. This
survey and another recent work in the literature by Combes et al.
(2010) for instance also emphasize that until recently, estimates
of agglomeration externalities suffered from serious endogeneity
problems. From a technical point of view, the estimation of geo-
graphical externalities is subject to two main sources of endogene-
ity: unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity bias.
Ciccone and Hall (1996) are the ﬁrst to address directly and
carefully these endogeneity issues. They study the impact of
county employment density on American states’ labor productiv-
ity. The authors insist that if there are unmeasured and/or unob-
served differences in the determinants of productivity across
states, and if these determinants are correlated with counties
employment density within states, the measure of the returns to
density by simple OLS may be spurious. They take the example
of climate or transportation infrastructures which will both en-
hance workers’ productivity and the attractiveness of the place.
They consequently resort to an instrumental variables approach.
Also controlling for the average level of education within the state
or the county, the authors ﬁnd that a doubling of local employment
density increases labor productivity by 5–6%.
Ciccone and Hall’s article represents an important step in the
empirical approach of agglomeration externalities. Nevertheless,
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their work relies on an aggregate measure of labor productivity. In
the present paper, the use of ﬁrms and plants panel data allows a
careful treatment of endogeneity issues and a measurement of
agglomeration externalities which is very close to the micro theo-
ries. As far as we know, Henderson (2003) was the ﬁrst paper to
use plant-level data for such an analysis and is the closest to the
present paper. His data is available at ﬁve years intervals from
1972 to 1992. He estimates a plant-level production function for
two broad sectors, machinery industries and high-tech industries,
and measures the elasticity of TFP to the number of other plants
of the same industry in the county. Using industry-time and
plant-location ﬁxed effects, he ﬁnds a positive and signiﬁcant elas-
ticity of 8% in the high-tech industry only.2 He does not ﬁnd evi-
dence of gains arising from agglomeration of ﬁrms belonging to
different industries . The use of ﬁxed effects accounts for a large part
of unobserved heterogeneity. Henderson also addresses the question
of simultaneity bias by adding location-time ﬁxed effects.
Our paper goes further than Henderson (2003) in several direc-
tions. We use French ﬁrms and plants panel data, for all manufac-
turing sectors, with yearly observations from 1996 to 2004. Our
sample is therefore larger and more complete than Henderson’s
one which allows us to deal with simultaneity bias and instrumen-
tation more directly. We adopt a two-step estimation strategy. We
ﬁrst estimate plant-level production functions for each two-digit
industry. Using those coefﬁcients, we then compute individual pro-
ductivities and estimate agglomeration economies through a GMM
speciﬁcation, decomposing carefully the agglomeration effects into
own industry (localization)/other industries (urbanization) exter-
nalities, as well as diversity and competition effects. We also dis-
cuss spatial selection of ﬁrms. In this paper, we ﬁnd that the
gains from clustering do exist: our benchmark regression shows
that a 10% increase of employment in neighboring plants of the
same industry increases a plant’s productivity by around 0.55%.
As stated above, these estimates are based on yearly variations in
TFP and are therefore best interpreted as short-run gains from
agglomeration, which has important implications in particular for
the source of the effects we are estimating. Since our paper focuses
on agglomeration economies that take place over a short period of
time, we believe that we capture externalities on the labor and in-
put markets, rather than technological spillovers or human capital
externalities that should take more time to realize.
The second consequence has to do with urbanization econo-
mies, which take probably even longer to implement. That we do
not ﬁnd evidence of urbanization economies should probably be
interpreted as the fact that they are better captured by cross-
sectional analysis than by the short-term analysis we conduct here.
Another way to understand our method is that it tries to purge pro-
ductivity from any ﬁrm-level component that is constant over time
to deal with endogeneity. But doing so, it also purges the analysis
from a large part of the long-term agglomeration economies ‘‘cap-
italized’’ in this ﬁxed ﬁrm-level component. Consequently, we con-
sider our paper to complement existing research that relies more
heavily on cross-sectional variations and which thus captures long-
er-term agglomeration gains.
Finally, using a non-linear speciﬁcation, we can estimate the
geography that maximizes short-run productivity gains from clus-
tering and compare it to the observed geography. A disturbing fea-
ture of the existing empirical literature is that one would be
tempted to conclude from the results usually obtained that more
agglomeration is always better because it increases the productiv-
ity of plants. This does not look very plausible as congestion costs
must necessarily appear and dominate at a certain level of agglom-
eration. If this was not so, one should also conclude that the
observed geography (where all plants of the same sector are not
located in the same region) is vastly suboptimal. Another impor-
tant contribution of this paper is that we ﬁnd the relation between
productivity gains and agglomeration to be bell-shaped. Previous
papers have failed to exhibit such a non-linear relationship be-
cause they were mostly based on long-run analysis; the presence
of ‘‘suboptimal’’ observations in the data, necessary to estimate a
bell-shaped curve, is indeed more plausible in the short-run. When
using a non-linear speciﬁcation, we are able to estimate the peak
agglomeration that maximizes the productivity gains.3 We ﬁnd
that a plant that would move (with its time-invariant idiosyncratic
characteristics and for a given level of employment and capital) from
a location with no other workers to a location with 1150 employees
in the same sector (the peak of the observed distribution in France)
would gain 53.8% in TFP. However, going to an ‘‘over-crowded’’ area
(with more than 9000 employees) would eliminate these TFP gains.
Hence, geography matters a lot for French plants and they are aware
of it: French plants seem to take into account the TFP gains in their
location choice. Indeed, when we compare the geography that max-
imizes productivity gains and the observed geography, we ﬁnd very
little difference between the two. From this point of view, our paper
suggests that the short term gains of cluster policies which aim is to
increase the size of clusters, should be very modest.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 details our
empirical strategy, Section 3 then proceeds to a description of
the data used, while Section 4 presents basic results and Section 5
goes further in the comprehension of short-run agglomeration
economies and assesses in particular the existence of non-
linearities.
2. Estimating agglomeration externalities: empirical strategy
2.1. The model
Agglomeration economies are generally assumed to improve
total factor productivity (TFP) of plants through localization
economies (externalities on inputs markets, on labor markets or
knowledge externalities, following the classiﬁcation proposed by
Marshall (1890)) and urbanization economies (cross fertilizations
of different industries on a given territory, as emphasized by Jane
Jacobs). When plant-level data is available, this suggests a natural
empirical strategy, based on the estimation of a Cobb–Douglas pro-
duction function4:
Yit ¼ AitKaitLbit ð1Þ
where Yit is value-added of plant i at time t, Ait is TFP, Kit the capital
stock and Lit the labor-force (in terms of employees) of plant i at
time t. We then assume that TFP of plant i depends on a plant-level
2 In regressions not reported here but available upon request, we also ran the
analysis separately for low-tech and medium low-tech industries on the one hand,
and high-tech and medium high-tech industries on the other hand. Agglomeration
economies are signiﬁcant for low-tech and medium low-tech industries only.
However, instruments do not pass the validity tests for high-tech and medium
high-tech industries.
3 Au and Henderson (2006) analyze this question for Chinese cities and also ﬁnd a
bell-shaped curve.
4 Combes et al. (2008a) (among many others) estimate agglomeration economies
using wages as a dependent variable. An advantage of using wages for the evaluation
of agglomeration economies is that wages are measured more precisely than TFP. The
measurement of TFP involves a variety of estimation procedures, which all have their
own issues or implementation problems. On the other hand, we do not know
precisely how agglomeration gains are distributed among production factors. If the
gains are not distributed in proportion to the share of each factor in value-added,
using wages could bias the estimation of agglomeration effects on productivity.
Therefore, we stick to the more direct method using TFP as a dependent variable here
(see Chapter 11 of Combes et al. (2008b) for the theoretical relationship between the
two methods).
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component, Uit, but also on its immediate environment in terms of
localization and urbanization economies:
Ait ¼ LOCszit
 d URBszit cUit; ð2Þ
where LOCszit is a measure of localization economies and URB
sz
it is a
measure of urbanization economies for plant i, which belongs to
sector s and area z, at time t. Log-linearizing expressions (1) and
(2), one obtains:
yit ¼ akit þ blit þ ait; ð3Þ
and
ait ¼ dlocszit þ curbszit þ uit ; ð4Þ
where lower-case letters denotes the log of upper-case variables in
Eqs. (1) and (2).
Our strategy consists ﬁrst in estimating Eq. (3) at the two-digit
industry level, used to calculate ait. We then estimate Eq. (4). The
model can be estimated by simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
regressions if all the independent variables are observable and at
least weakly exogenous, but this hypothesis is rarely valid. Conse-
quently, several estimation issues arise that we now detail.
2.2. Estimation issues
Two main issues arise when estimating production functions
and agglomeration economies: unobserved heterogeneity and
simultaneity. Several estimation procedures of production func-
tions have been developed since the mid-1990s in order to cope
with these issues. We follow Levinsohn and Petrin’s (2003) approach.
We obtain standard estimates for inputs elasticities, ranging
approximately from 0.6 to 0.85 for labor and from 0.07 to 0.35
for capital. Most of the results presented in this paper are robust
when using an OLS estimate for TFP. In the following, we detail
successively unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity issues
for the estimation of agglomeration economies and we propose
methods to solve them.
2.2.1. Unobserved heterogeneity
Some characteristics, unobserved by the econometrician, can be
related to both plant-level TFP and some of the explanatory vari-
ables. In this case, uit is correlated with the independent variables;
consequently, the OLS estimates of the coefﬁcients are potentially
biased, since the endogenous variables will partly capture the
effect of unobserved characteristics. This issue is better known as
the ‘‘unobserved heterogeneity’’ problem. In our speciﬁcation,
locszit and urb
sz
it are both likely to be correlated with uit: Local cli-
mate, transportation infrastructures, natural resources or public
services to plants can in many ways increase the TFP of a plant.
In the same time, a region richly endowed with those environmen-
tal elements will be more attractive for ﬁrms. There is a positive
correlation between unobserved (or unmeasured) plant’s environ-
mental variables and localization and/or urbanization indices
which potentially biases the estimation of d and c.
The ﬁrst estimations of agglomeration economies were often
based on aggregate and cross-sectional data (as Shefer (1973) or
Sveikauskas (1975) for example) that could not take into account
the potential biases just mentioned. The use of plant-level panel
data enables us to address directly these questions.
If we consider plants that do not change industry or region
across time, the plant-level environmental unobserved characteris-
tics can be appropriately dealt with using plants’ ﬁxed effects,
which will take into account all plants’ speciﬁc characteristics that
are invariant across time, whether or not those characteristics are
observable. This amounts to assuming that uit = /i + it:
ait ¼ dlocszit þ curbszit þ /i þ it; ð5Þ
where the remaining error term it is now assumed to have the re-
quired properties, and in particular not to be correlated with
explanatory variables.
Combes et al. (2007, 2008a) have shown the spatial sorting of
workers to be important. That spatial sorting must be reﬂected in
plants’ TFP but we do not have information about the skills mix
within plants. If skills composition of plants’ workforce does not
change over the period, plant-level ﬁxed effect will also take into
account the heterogeneous quality of labor among plants.
Using a panel of ﬁrms over several years, one can use standard
ﬁxed effects techniques, which involve the introduction of a set of
plant dummies, or equivalently mean-differencing expression (5).
Alternatively, one can ‘‘eliminate’’ /i using a time differencing
approach. The estimated equation is in this case:
Dait ¼ dDlocszit þ cDurbszit þ Dit: ð6Þ
However, unobserved heterogeneity is not the only source of endo-
geneity affecting agglomeration effects estimation.
2.2.2. Simultaneity bias
Estimating agglomeration economies raises simultaneity issues:
as a consequence of the negative (or positive) economic shock in
the region or in the industry, other ﬁrms may close (open) or lay
off (hire) employees. it, loc
sz
it and urb
sz
it are possibly correlated
and the estimations of d and c may be spurious.
To address the simultaneity issue, we adopt a GMM approach.
The method follows Bond (2002): we start by ﬁrst-differencing
each variable, as in (6) to address the unobserved heterogeneity
issue. We then instrument ﬁrst-differenced independent variables
by their level at time t  2, following a GMM procedure. The eco-
nomic rationale to use lagged levels as instruments is convergence:
for each variable, we expect ﬁrst-differences to be negatively cor-
related to the past level of variables. The underlying econometric
assumption is that the idiosyncratic shock at time t  2 is orthog-
onal to Dit, which makes the instruments exogenous.
At this stage, several remarks are in order about the type of
agglomeration economies that one can capture with a GMM
estimation.
2.3. What can we learn about agglomeration economies from GMM?
Glaeser and Mare (2001), followed by Combes et al. (2008a)
among others estimate the impact of agglomeration on wages
exploiting workers who move as a source of variation; such a strat-
egy is hard to replicate for plants since those are less mobile.5 We
focus our analysis on plants that do not change area nor sector over
the time period under study and we exploit short-run variations
of agglomeration variables by resorting to ﬁxed effects or ﬁrst-
differences estimations. This is very different from exploiting cross-
sectional variations like in Combes et al. (2007) or Barbesol and
Briant (2008). Indeed, estimation strategies based on cross-sectional
variations capture the impact of agglomeration economies accumu-
lated during all the years that precede the year of observation of
data. Such analyses consequently address the issue of the impact
of spatial agglomeration in the long-run. On the contrary, our esti-
mation strategy, based on yearly variations in the data, will capture
short-run effects of spatial agglomeration. Our focus is thus different
from previous papers and some of our results, such as the absence
of urbanization economies and the non-linearity of localization
5 In fact, it is even hard from a statistical point of view to systematically detect
movements of producing units inside France. The identiﬁcation number of each
producing unit is supposed to be location-dependent and should therefore change
when the unit is re-located.
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economies, may be speciﬁc to this short-run approach. Conse-
quently, they should not be seen as conﬂicting with previous results
obtained in the literature but as complementary. This focus on the
short-run raises some important conceptual and theoretical issues
about agglomeration economies:
1. The type of agglomeration economies: The literature has distin-
guished intra-industry (localization) from inter-industry
(urbanization) agglomeration economies. It seems reasonable
to expect urbanization economies to take place over a longer
time period, and therefore be captured by the ﬁxed ﬁrm-level
component that we difference out with our methodology. Fail-
ure to ﬁnd important short-run urbanization economies does
not mean that they do not exist in the longer run.
2. The channels of agglomeration economies: We think that our
strategy may hardly capture technological/knowledge spill-
overs, since a long time is probably needed for new ideas to
circulate and be implemented in neighboring ﬁrms.6 Neverthe-
less, knowledge spillovers are only one of the sources of
agglomeration economies, and according to Rosenthal and
Strange (2001) and Ellison et al. (2010), they would not be
the main one. Agglomeration economies on the labor and
inputs’ markets are more direct externalities and their impact
could thus be more rapidly detected. The opening of new plants
or the growth of existing plants in a given sector-area could
make it proﬁtable for public authorities to propose speciﬁc
trainings that could improve workers’ efﬁciency. It could also
become proﬁtable for some transport companies to serve the
ﬁrms in the area which would decrease the production costs
there. We believe that we capture that kind of externalities by
using short-term variations.
3. Local infrastructures and the bell-shaped curve: Previous studies
found a monotonic effect of agglomeration economies. This is
to some extent puzzling since theory in economic geography
and urban economics suggests that besides positive agglomer-
ation externalities, congestion effects exist and could, all else
equal, offset agglomeration economies above a certain thresh-
old. In this respect, it might be argued that short-run varia-
tions are the relevant focus point to detect non-linear
agglomeration economies, since rational proﬁt-maximizing
ﬁrms should all be located in optimal places in the long-run.
Moreover, it is possible that gains from agglomeration are
bell-shaped in the short-run but less so in the longer run.
Indeed, in the medium-run or in the long-run, public authori-
ties should provide the necessary local public services and
infrastructure to avoid congestion effects. The estimation of
agglomeration effects in the long-run could thus consist in
the estimation of an envelop curve corresponding to the
increasing segments of successive bell-shaped curves. This
would explain why papers based on cross-sectional variations
usually ﬁnd a linear effect of agglomeration, unable to capture
short-run non-linearities.
Finally, from an empirical point of view, we show in Section 4.1
that even though plant-level TFP is largely explained by time-
invariant elements, the within dimension is not negligible and is
highly correlated with département–industry–year ﬁxed effects.
Consequently, the investigation of short-run agglomeration econo-
mies is worth scientiﬁc scrutiny. We do not provide in this paper a
complete theoretical framework to deal with the temporal scope of
agglomeration economies and the provision of local infrastruc-
tures, but it could be a fruitful direction for future theoretical
research.
3. Data and variables
We present in this section the data we use, the way we build
our sample and some issues about the construction of our
variables.
3.1. The French annual business surveys: data and selection issues
We use French annual business surveys7 data, provided by the
French Ministry of Industry. We have information at the ﬁrm and
at the plant level. The data set covers all the ﬁrms with more than
20 employees, or some smaller ﬁrms with sales higher than 5 mil-
lions euros, and all the plants of those ﬁrms over the 1996–2004
period.
At the ﬁrm-level, we have all balance-sheet data (production,
value-added, employment, capital, exports, aggregate wages etc.)
and information about the ﬁrm’s location, industry classiﬁcation
and structure (number of plants, etc.). At the plant-level, data are
less exhaustive; they mainly contain plant location, plant industry
classiﬁcation, number of employees and information about the
ﬁrm the plant belongs to. Capital and value-added data are avail-
able at the ﬁrm level only, which is a problem for multi-plant ﬁrms.
However, estimating agglomeration economies for multi-plant
ﬁrms is also a problem since the deﬁnition of the relevant geo-
graphic environment for a ﬁrm that would have a plant in Paris
and another one in Marseille is not straightforward. To cope with
these issues, we decide to run our analysis at the plant-level, allo-
cating ﬁrm-level value-added and capital among plants according
to their respective share in ﬁrm’s total employment. We are aware
that this strategy is not without raising concerns. This is why we
show in Section 5.3 that the main result of the paper, the one on
the bell-shaped curve, holds for different samples that are not sub-
ject to this capital and value-added allocation rule.
Annual business surveys cover ﬁrms larger than 20 employees.
There is consequently a selection of ﬁrms in our sample according
to their size. Theoretical work (Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008; Baldwin
and Okubo, 2006) has shown that there might be spatial selec-
tion of ﬁrms, the most productive ones being predominantly
located in denser areas. Yet, we know that bigger ﬁrms are more
productive. The incompleteness of our sample could consequently
be a problem. In this respect, note ﬁrst that we run the analysis at
the plant-level which allows us to consider entities smaller than 20
employees (i.e., plants smaller than 20 employees belonging to
ﬁrms bigger than 20 employees), which does not solve entirely
the problem of representativeness of our sample, but hopefully
reduces it.8 Moreover, if the unobserved efﬁciency parameter is ﬁxed
over time, it is adequately taken into account by a plant-level ﬁxed
effect or by ﬁrst-differences. Note that since we keep in the sample
plants that do not change industry nor area over the period, this
strategy also controls for the quality of local infrastructure and pub-
lic services. Nevertheless, it is true that we base our estimation on a
large time-span (9 years): the quality of local transport infrastruc-
ture and public services might change over the period. If these
changes are correlated with changes in agglomeration variables,
estimation will be spurious in spite of plant-level ﬁxed effects. The
resort to ﬁrst-differences has here a great advantage: it allows us
to control for all characteristics that do not change at the plant-level
over two consecutive years, and not only over the entire period. In
that sense, ﬁrst-differences are less restrictive in terms of ﬁxed char-
acteristics that are taken into account. There still remains a problem
for the years in which changes occur. This is why we instrument
6 The same is probably true for human capital externalities.
7 Called in French ‘‘Enquêtes annuelles d’entreprises’’.
8 We focus on plants bigger than 10 employees, since the estimation of production
functions is made difﬁcult by the small sample of very small ﬁrms. Plants between 10
and 20 employees represent 10% of the sample.
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ﬁrst-differenced variables by their level in (t  2). Given reported
tests, we are conﬁdent that our estimation strategy deals adequately
with this spatial selection issue.
3.2. The variables
Firm value-added, employees and capital (measured at the
beginning of the year) are directly available in the annual business
surveys. The creation of agglomeration variables is more elaborate.
First of all, the geographical and the sectoral level of aggregation
could have an impact on our measure of agglomeration econo-
mies.9 This is why we decided to focus on two geographical entities,
the départements, which are administrative entities (there are 100
départements in France, of which 4 are overseas départements)
and the employment areas, which are economic entities deﬁned on
the basis of workers’ commuting (there are 348 employment areas
in metropolitan France). From a sectoral point of view, we consider
the French sectoral classiﬁcation (Naf) at both the three and two-
digit levels. Consequently, we create our agglomeration variables at
four levels: département/Naf 3-digit, employment area/Naf 3-digit,
département/Naf 2-digit and employment area/Naf 2-digit. The def-
inition of our variables follows:
 Localization economies: to deal with intra-industry externalities,
we compute, for each plant, the number of other employees
working in the same industry and in the same area. Concretely,
we use the annual business surveys at the plant-level and calcu-
late the number of workers by year, industry and area. For plant
i, in industry s, area z and time t, we then deﬁne our localization
economies variable as:
locszit ¼ ln employeesszt  employeesszit þ 1
 
:
 Urbanization economies: we use two variables to capture urban-
ization economies. The ﬁrst one is the number of workers in
other industries on the territory z where plant i is located.10
Using the same notation, we have:
urbszt ¼ ln employeeszt  employeesszt þ 1
 
:
We also add an industrial diversity index
divszt ¼ ln
1
Hszt
 
;
faced by plants of industry s, territory z and time t, with Hszt deﬁned
as follows:
Hszt ¼
X
s0–s
employeess
0z
t
employeeszt  employeesszt
 !2
:
We introduce a last variable to control for local strength of com-
petitive pressure. The use of such a variable aims to test Michael
Porter’s idea about competition and agglomeration: competition
whips up innovation so that more intense competition within clus-
ters improves ﬁrms’ performance (Porter, 1998). We therefore use
an Herﬁndahl index of employment concentration inside industry s
and area z:
Herf szt ¼
X
j2Sszt
employeesszjt
employeesszt
 !2
;
where Sszt is the set of ﬁrms belonging to industry s on territory z at
time t.11 The variable
compszt ¼ ln
1
Herf szt
 !
measures the degree of competition a plant of sector s faces on ter-
ritory z at time t. This gives us the relation we want to bring to data:
ait ¼ dlocszit þ curbszit þ ldivszt þ kcompszt þ /i þ it: ð7Þ
3.3. Construction of the sample
We create four samples, crossing the two territorial and the two
sectoral levels mentioned in the previous section, and proceed to
several ‘‘cleaning’’ procedures. From a geographical point of view,
we drop all plants located in Corsica and in overseas départements.
Consequently, our sample covers the 94 and the 341 continental
French départements and employment areas respectively. Indus-
try-wise, we keep in the sample plants that belong to manufactur-
ing sectors only. Plants in the food-processing sector have been
dropped, since the information related to those plants come from
a different survey, not entirely compatible with the rest of manu-
facturing. The sample we use in our estimations spans over nine-
teen 2-digit and eighty-eight 3-digit industrial sectors.12
For each sample, we drop all plants that changed geographical
unit or industrial sector during the period.13 Indeed, we do not
know if such information reﬂects true relocation or errors in report-
ing. Our effects are consequently not identiﬁed on ‘‘movers’’ but, for
a given plant, on the growth of agglomeration variables across time.
We also make simple error checks; among other things, we drop all
observations for which value-added, employment or capital are
missing, negative or null. We deﬂate value-added data by an indus-
try-level price index and capital data by a national investment price
index.
Finally we clean up our sample from large outliers, dropping the
1% extreme values for the following variables: capital intensity,
yearly mean capital intensity growth rate, yearly capital growth
rate, yearly employment growth rate.
3.4. Summary statistics
In this section, we present summary statistics for the Départe-
ment/Naf 3-digit sample, on which we will focus most of our
empirical analysis.
Table 1
Temporal composition of the sample Département/Naf 3-digit.
Year Observations Percent Cum. percent
1996 25,469 11.77 11.77
1997 24,458 11.31 23.08
1998 24,287 11.23 34.31
1999 24,093 11.14 45.45
2000 23,993 11.09 56.54
2001 23,973 11.08 67.62
2002 23,709 10.96 78.58
2003 23,504 10.86 89.44
2004 22,854 10.56 100.00
Total 216,340 100.00
9 For more details about the impact of spatial zoning on economic geography
estimations, see Briant et al. (2010).
10 From the point of view of the plant, the variables lit ; loc
sz
it and urb
sz
t operate an
exhaustive tripartition of local employment in manufacturing.
11 We assume that plants from the same ﬁrm are not direct competitors. We
construct Herf szt from plant-level data, so that employees
sz
jt is really the number of
employees working in plants of ﬁrm j on territory z at time t.
12 In the French 2-digit classiﬁcation, manufacturing sectors correspond to sector 17
(textile) to sector 36 (miscellaneous), sector 23 (reﬁning) excluded.
13 At the Départements/Naf 3-digit level, they represent around 5% of the
observations.
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Table 1 shows how our sample exhibits temporal attrition. This
is due to the fact that during the recent period, manufacturing
industry has been losing, in France as in other industrial countries,
many ﬁrms and employees.
Table 2 shows the usual descriptive statistics of our variables.
First note that most variables exhibit strong variability, as shown
by the large values of standard deviations respective to their mean.
The minimum value for the localization economies variable (in
terms of employees and of plants) is zero: some plants are the sole
representative of their industry in their département. For those
plants, there are consequently no localization economies.14
Note that the minimum value of plants’ number of employees is
11; we focus on plants bigger than 10 employees because the esti-
mation of production functions for smaller plants is difﬁcult due to
more measurement errors and less observations for such plants.
Table 12 in the Appendix displays between and within varia-
tions of log variables for the sample used in the GMM estimation.
Even if between variations account for a large part of heterogene-
ity, within standard-deviation is not negligible (above 10% for all
variables except the urbanization economies one). Hence, our iden-
tiﬁcation strategy based on short-run variations appears valid (ex-
cept maybe, as stated earlier, for urbanization economies).
4. How large are agglomeration economies?
As analyzed in Section 2.2, estimates of agglomeration econo-
mies suffer from two main biases, unobserved heterogeneity and
simultaneity. We address those two problems through a ﬁxed
effects approach ﬁrst (for unobserved heterogeneity), and then
through a GMM approach. Before presenting empirical results,
we perform a variance decomposition analysis in order to assess
the extent to which agglomeration economies can explain short-
run variations of plant-level productivity.
4.1. Variance decomposition analysis
Variance decomposition is a useful exercise since it allows us to
assess how much of plant-level TFP observed variations we can
hope to explain by exploiting short-run variations. We ﬁrst regress
plant-level TFP, obtained through the estimation of Levinsohn and
Petrin (2003) production functions at the two-digit level, on year
dummies and plant ﬁxed effects. Not surprisingly, as shown in
Table 3, plant ﬁxed effects capture most of plant-level TFP variations.
We then regress in Table 4 the plant ﬁxed effects on the average
number of employees in the other plants from the same industry-
département (localization economies) and in the plants from the
other industries of the département (urbanization economies).
Table 4 shows that both localization and urbanization economies
explain signiﬁcantly the time-invariant element of plant-level
TFP, with coefﬁcients that are close to those obtained by Combes
et al. (2008a) or Barbesol and Briant (2008), even though data
and methodologies differ. However, Table 3 shows that the time-
varying dimension contained in the residuals, even though much
less important, is not null and is positively correlated with plant-
level TFP. In addition, if we regress plant-level TFP net of plant
ﬁxed effects (the plant residual) on département–industry–year
dummies, we can see in the bottom part of Table 3 that the stan-
dard-deviation of département–industry–year ﬁxed effects is equal
to half of the standard-deviation of plant-level time-varying TFP.
These département–industry–year ﬁxed are moreover highly cor-
related with time-varying component of plant-level TFP.
To sum up, plant-level TFP is largely explained by time-invariant
elements, among which average localization and urbanization
economies over the period. However, the variance decomposition
shows that the within dimension is not negligible and that it is
highly correlated with département–industry–year ﬁxed effects.
In the investigation of the effect of agglomeration economies on
plant-level TFP, the time dimension is important.
4.2. Measuring agglomeration economies taking into account
unobserved heterogeneity
We now turn to actual regressions. As stated in Section 2, all
explanatory variables in our regressions are potentially correlated
Table 2
Summary statistics Département/Naf 3-digit.
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Value-added 5104.56 18357.77 1.43 1,440,578
Plant’s employment 93.41 256.86 11 19,385
Plant’s capital 6554.73 39285.63 10.85 4,283,886
# Employees, other plants, same industry–area 1762.04 3205.69 0 24,475
# Other plants, same industry–area 33.48 76.01 0 874
# Other employees, other industries–same area 44337.15 30867.67 357 135,657
# Other plants, other industries–same area 665.30 509.11 12 2873
Note: Number of observations: 216,340 in all rows. Value-added and capital are expressed in thousands of real euros.
Table 3
Summary statistics variance decomposition of TFP (Levinsohn–Petrin).
Std. dev. Corr. with plant TFP
Plant TFP 0.600 1.000
Plant ﬁxed effect 0.559 0.935
Plant residual (TFP – ﬁxed effect) 0.210 0.350
Corr. with plant residual
(TFP – ﬁxed effect)
Plant residual (TFP – ﬁxed effect) 0.210 1.000
Département–industry–year
ﬁxed effects
0.101 0.482
Table 4
Local determinants of plant ﬁxed effects, Département/Naf 3-digit.
Dep. var.: Plant ﬁxed effect
Average ln(# employees, other plants,
same industry–area + 1)
0.016a
(0.004)
Average ln(# employees, other industries, same area) 0.038a
(0.005)
Industry ﬁxed effects Yes
N 46,855
R2 0.526
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected to take into
account autocorrelation at the industry-département level.
a Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
b Signiﬁcance at 5% level.
c Signiﬁcance at 10% level.
14 Since locszit ¼ lnðemployeesszt  employeesszit þ 1Þ; locszit ¼ 0 when employeesszt 
employeesszit ¼ 0.
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with omitted time-invariant variables. To capture these, we add
plant ﬁxed effects to the simple OLS regression. To capture shocks
which affect all ﬁrms of the sample in a given year, we also use
year ﬁxed effects. Results are presented in Table 5.
The ﬁrst two regressions concentrate on localization and urban-
ization economies. According to the simple OLS regression of col-
umn (1), increasing by 10% the number of other workers of the
same industry–area, keeping the size of the other sectors in the
area constant, increases the TFP of a plant by 0.24%. Considering
the other variable, increasing the size of the other sectors in the
area by 10%, increases the TFP of a plant, all else equal, by 0.54%.
Those results would indicate a domination of urbanization econo-
mies at the ﬁrm-level. The estimation of agglomeration economies
must however deal with the spatial selection of plants. Column (2)
controls for this issue by integrating plant ﬁxed effects. Doing so,
we exploit the variance over time of different variables. Since we
focus on plants that do not change industry or area over the period,
these ﬁxed effects also control for differences in terms of local
endowments or industrial speciﬁcities that are ﬁxed over time.
Localization economies are now the only ones to be signiﬁcant,
with a small, but highly signiﬁcant coefﬁcient. Controlling for local
competition and sectoral diversity does not affect the results. Com-
petition appears to have a positive impact on plant-level TFP in the
short-run, but the coefﬁcient is only weakly signiﬁcant. However,
controlling for plant ﬁxed effects does not solve potential simulta-
neity issues. We now reﬁne our ﬁrst results with an instrumental
variables approach.
4.3. Measuring agglomeration economies taking into account both
unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity
In order to correct the simultaneity bias, we resort, as explained
above, to a GMM approach. Such a method reduces drastically the
size of the sample, since an observation is included if and only if,
for the same plant, the two preceding observations are also avail-
able. Consequently, the ﬁrst two years of the sample, 1996 and
1997, are dropped and only plants that survive long enough are
considered. This may be an issue if agglomeration affects ﬁrm sur-
vival. Three cases must be distinguished:
 Plants in agglomerated areas have higher survival rates due to bet-
ter unobserved characteristics: this should not be a problem,
since plant-level characteristics that are ﬁxed over time are
purged by ﬁrst-differences.
 Agglomeration has a positive effect on survival rate through a pro-
ductivity channel: in that case, not controlling for exit could lead
to underestimating agglomeration economies. However, our
estimation strategy still captures the evolution of productivity
for years preceding the exit, and thus measures part of the effect
for disappearing ﬁrms.
 Agglomeration has a negative effect on survival rate through a
competition effect: not taking this into account could lead to an
overestimation of agglomeration economies. However, Combes
et al. (2009) show that this is not the case for French ﬁrms:
differences in terms of productivity between areas are mainly
explained by local externalities and not by selection. Consis-
tently with this result, in unreported regressions, we estimate
a logit and we show that conditioning on ﬁrm-level size, pro-
ductivity, wages, industry ﬁxed effects and area ﬁxed effects,
local variables (size of the industry, size of other industries,
competition and diversity) have a less important impact on
plant-level survival than internal variables, either in terms of
statistical signiﬁcance or in terms of marginal effect.
We thus conclude that survival bias is unlikely to be a major
issue for our estimation.
Regressions (1) and (3) of Table 6 are OLS on ﬁrst-differenced
variables. In regressions (2) and (4), we instrument ﬁrst-differenced
variables by levels in t  2 and use the GMM option. Standard
errors are clustered at the area–industry–year level. Indeed,
Moulton (1990) showed that when not doing so, regressing indi-
vidual variables on aggregate variables could induce a downward
bias in the standard errors. First-stage regressions are presented
in an online Appendix. For all variables, the ﬁrst difference is
negatively and signiﬁcantly affected by the level in t  2. Since
Cragg–Donald and Stock and Yogo tests are not strictly valid in
the presence of heteroskedasticity, we refer to the often used ‘‘rule
of thumb’’ to test for the presence of weak instruments: For each
ﬁrst-stage regression, the F-statistic is at least equal to 10 so that
there is no evidence of weak instruments problem.We also present
the Kleinbergen–Paap weak-identiﬁcation test, that is valid in
the presence of heteroskedasticity. In all cases (except at the
Département-Naf 2-digit level, see below), the test is passed.
Our results show that there are positive and signiﬁcant localiza-
tion economies in the short-run: for a plant, all other things being
equal, a 10% increase from one year to the other in the number of
workers of the industry in the rest of the employment area in-
creases the value-added produced by that ﬁrm by around 0.5–0.6%.
Table 5
Fixed effects approach, Département/Naf 3-digit.
Dep. var.: ln Levinsohn–Petrin TFP
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(# employees, other plants, same industry–area + 1) 0.024a 0.008a 0.037a 0.007a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ln(# employees, other industries, same area) 0.054a 0.017 0.066a 0.018
(0.004) (0.019) (0.004) (0.020)
Competition 0.038a 0.008c
(0.004) (0.005)
Sectoral diversity 0.072a 0.003
(0.007) (0.011)
Time ﬁxed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Plant ﬁxed effects No Yes No Yes
N 216,340 216,340 216,340 216,340
# Plants 46,855 46,855 46,855 46,855
R2 0.028 0.018 0.032 0.018
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected to take into account individual autocorrelation.
a Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
b Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
c Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
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The number of employees in the other sectors of the area, compe-
tition and sectoral diversity have no signiﬁcant impact. Moreover,
our speciﬁcation is robust to the Sargan–Hansen test of joint valid-
ity of instruments. The economic rationale which underlies our
empirical strategy is therefore not invalidated. Again, these effects
are based on yearly variations and should thus be interpreted as
short-run effects.
We note that the estimated coefﬁcient on localization variable
is larger compared to the ﬁxed effects estimation and very close
to the estimates in the existing literature (see Rosenthal and
Strange (2004)). While we expected a positive correlation between
shocks and the agglomeration variables locszit and urb
sz
it , this sug-
gests that the correlation was rather negative. A ﬁrst explanation
is the presence of measurement errors in the agglomeration vari-
ables, which would cause a downward bias in the ﬁxed effects esti-
mates. A second explanation is linked to an argument made by
Cingano and Schivardi (2004). They suggest that there is a possible
negative impact of an increase of productivity on employment. In-
deed, if demand is sufﬁciently inelastic, a positive productivity
shock may negatively affect employment. The macroeconomic lit-
erature (see Gali (1999) for example) corroborates the idea that in
the short-run, a positive technology shock reduces employment.
Our instrumentation strategy may enable us to correct for this
problem which was biasing downwards our non-instrumented
regressions.
To sum up, for French ﬁrms and in the short-run, no evidence of
Jacobs’ urbanization economies is detected: ceteris paribus, sec-
toral diversity and the scale of activities in other sectors have no
signiﬁcant effect on ﬁrms’ TFP. When exploiting annual variations
of the data, the only source of agglomeration economies are local-
ization externalities, with a positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient
indicating that a 10% increase of employment in neighboring ﬁrms
of the same industry increases a ﬁrm productivity by around 0.5–
0.6%.
The results in the literature regarding the strength of localiza-
tion vs urbanization economies are mixed. Henderson (2003) or
Rosenthal and Strange (2003) show the domination of localization
economies on US data, while Combes et al. (2007) or Barbesol and
Briant (2008) show the reverse on French data. Our results can
therefore be seen as complementing the conclusions reached by
the two papers on French ﬁrm-level data. Recall that we measure
the impact of agglomeration economies on short-run variations
of plant-level TFP, while these two papers focus on cross-sectional,
and thus long-run variations. One interpretation, which can help
reconcile conﬂicting results in the literature, is that the nature of
agglomeration economies varies with time.
4.4. Marginal effects and explanatory power of localization economies
In this section, we analyze the impact of the choice of classiﬁca-
tion on the intensity of localization economies; we then study the
explanatory power of localization economies.
4.4.1. Different intensities for localization economies or modiﬁable
areal unit problem?
We reproduce the same analysis for the other three levels of
sectoral and geographical aggregation. The results of GMM regres-
sions are presented in Tables 15 and 16 in the appendix. Localization
economies are signiﬁcant in all cases except at the Employment
area/Naf 3-digit industry when competition and diversity are
accounted for. The coefﬁcient at the Département/Naf 2-digit
level is strikingly high. The Kleinbergen–Paap and Sargan–Hansen
statistics show that GMM perform poorly at this level of aggregation
making those results unreliable. Since diversity and competition
are never signiﬁcant, we always ignore these variables in the
following.
As we can see in Table 7, the impact of a doubling of the local-
ization economies variable on productivity varies according to the
aggregation level.15 They are in particular much smaller at the
Employment area/Naf 3-digit level. Two explanations are possible:
localization economies really vary according to the spatial and the
industrial level of aggregation, or the different intensities are only
due to statistical noise (this problem is also known as Modiﬁable
Areal Unit Problem (MAUP), see Briant et al. (2010)). At this stage,
we cannot distinguish between those two effects.
4.4.2. Explanatory power of localization economies
The explanatory power of a variable depends both on the value
of the coefﬁcient attached to it and on its variability. If a variable
has a very low variance, its explanatory power will be small, even
if it has a large coefﬁcient. The explanatory power of an indepen-
dent variable is strong if, all other things being equal, a standard-
deviation of that variable implies a large variation of the dependent
variable.16 We consequently calculated the explanatory power of
localization economies. The results are presented in Table 8. The
explanatory power of localization economies variables appears small
but non negligible.
5. Robustness checks and further issues
5.1. Who generates externalities: plants or employees?
Theory offers several possible channels for localization econo-
mies. A notable alternative is whether externalities transit through
Table 6
Instrumental variables approach, Département/Naf 3-digit.
Dep. var.: Dln Levinsohn–Petrin TFP
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dln(# employees, other plants,
same industry–area + 1)
0.002 0.059b 0.002 0.055c
(0.002) (0.028) (0.002) (0.029)
Dln(# employees, other
industries, same area)
0.005 0.060 0.003 0.005
(0.021) (0.149) (0.022) (0.206)
Dln(sectoral diversity) 0.013 0.056
(0.012) (0.130)
Dln(competition) 0.002 0.057
(0.005) (0.047)
N 126,794 126,794 126,794 126,794
# Plants 29,514 29,514 29,514 29,514
R2 0.003 0.0006 0.003 0.0004
Kleinbergen–Paap test 60.581 15.158
Hansen overidentiﬁcation test
p-value
0.402 0.130
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. (1) and (3) simple OLS, (2) and (4) are GMM,
with standard errors clustered at the area–industry–year level. For columns (2) and
(4), R2 are computed as the squared correlation between the predicted and actual
values of the dependent variable.
a Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
b Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
c Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
Table 7
Results across aggregation levels.
Dép./Naf 3-digit EA/Naf 3-digit Dép./Naf 2-digit EA/Naf 2-digit
4.17% 1.96% n.a. 3.89%
Note: Each column gives the percentage increase in productivity following a dou-
bling of the localization economies for each sample.
15 If lny = alnx, y increases in percentage by (2a  1)  100 when x is doubled.
16 If lny = alnx, we deﬁne the explanatory power of x as ½expða lnð1þ rxx ÞÞ  1 
100 = ½ð1þ rxx Þa  1  100, where rx and x are the standard deviation and the mean
of x respectively.
P. Martin et al. / Journal of Urban Economics 69 (2011) 182–195 189
Author's personal copy
ﬁrms or workers. For a ﬁrm, is it the same to have in the neighbor-
hood one ﬁrm of the industry with a hundred employees or ten
ﬁrms, each of them employing ten workers ? The question is
important for policy makers interested in clusters; according to
the answer, an extensive or an intensive development strategy will
be preferable.
Henderson (2003) ﬁnds that plants generate externalities, but
not workers. If we consider each plant as a source of knowledge,
this result is the sign, according to Henderson, that information
spillovers are more important than labor market externalities.
Our results are quite different. For a plant i from sector s in area
z at time t, we decompose the number of employees in its own
industry–area into two components: the number of plants in sector
s and area z at time t and the average size of those plants. Keeping
the number of plants constant, an increase of the average size of
plants generates an increase of the total number of employees in
the sector. We present in Table 9 the results of GMM estimations.
When the number of own industry plants and their average size
are both taken into account, the latter is the only one to be signif-
icant. Interestingly enough, coefﬁcients on the average size vari-
able are very close to those on the localization economies
variable in our ﬁrst speciﬁcation.
To sum up, the case of French ﬁrms indicates that in the short-
run, there are no speciﬁc externalities we can attribute to plants
per se but that there are positive and signiﬁcant externalities linked
to the number of employees in surrounding plants. The number of
employees in the other plants is a better indicator of the size of the
industry a plant faces on its territory than the number of plants.
This points to an interpretation under which localization econo-
mies are, for a plant, due to the ‘‘thickness’’ of the industry around
it. Our results are interesting for policy makers; they suggest that
boosting externalities within clusters involves the promotion of
internal growth of existing plants or the attraction of big plants
on the territory rather than multiplying the number of small
plants. Moreover, our results support those of Rosenthal and
Strange (2001), who ﬁnd, on American data, that labor pooling
and input–output linkages are – in this order – the two main deter-
minants of industries co-agglomeration.
5.2. Do small plants beneﬁt more from localization economies than the
others?
The impact of localization economies may be heterogeneous
across plants. Speciﬁcally, small plants may be more dependent
on their local environment, and thus more sensitive to agglomera-
tion economies. To test this idea, we split the samples at each level
of aggregation according to the size of plants with respect to the
average in the sample. As emphasized in Table 10, we ﬁnd that
localization economies are stronger for plants that are smaller than
the average plant in the sample. This conﬁrms the intuition that
smaller plants beneﬁt more from localization economies than the
others.17
5.3. Is there enough clustering?
Our results show that plant productivity increases with cluster-
ing. Does this imply that more clustering is always better and that
public intervention to increase the size of clusters is justiﬁed? In
theoretical models, clustering has the characteristic of an external-
ity: plants beneﬁt from the fact that other plants in the same sector
decide to choose to locate nearby. These plants do not internalize
the productivity beneﬁt they bring to other plants through this
location choice. This suggests that the market equilibrium may
be characterized by suboptimal clustering that would translate
into suboptimal productivity. This is the basic argument (although
not always put in these terms) that many proponents of cluster
policies (such as Michael Porter) put forward to defend public pol-
icies that help foster larger clusters.
However, besides cluster beneﬁts, other externalities, such as
congestion effects may also exist. These congestion effects could
affect the utility of agents (through increased trafﬁc, pollution,
etc.) which we cannot measure, but could also impact negatively
local growth18 and the productivity of ﬁrms. Combes and Duranton
(2006) also show that ﬁrms, when they cluster in the same local
labor market, face a trade-off between the beneﬁts of labor pooling
(i.e., access to workers whose knowledge helps reduce costs) and
the costs of labor poaching (i.e., loss of some key workers due to
competition between plants that would have a negative impact on
the productivity). The existence of such a trade-off means that the
productivity–cluster relationship may not be linear. This suggests
that the effect we measured is the average net effect of localization
economies and congestion effects.
To test the existence of such non-linear localization economies,
we introduce in the former regression quadratic and cubic terms of
the localization economies variable.19 We retain a GMM estimation
on ﬁrst-differenced variables and compute standard errors using
Moulton’s correction.
Results are presented in Table 11. We run the regressions on the
sample used so far, but also on single-plant ﬁrms only, since for
Table 8
Explanatory power of localization economies.
Naf 3-digit Naf 2-digit
Dep. Emp. area Dep. Emp. area
# Employees, other plants,
same industry–area
6.29% 3.70% n.a. 5.99%
Note: The table reads as follows: for a plant, all other things being equal, a standard-
deviation with respect to the mean of the number of employees in the other plants
from the same industry–area generates, at the Département/Naf 3-digit level, an
increase of plant-level productivity by 6.29%.
Table 9
Instrumental variables approach/employees, plants and agglomeration economies.
Dep. var.: Dln Levinsohn–Petrin TFP
Model Dép./Naf
3-digit
EA/Naf
3-digit
EA/Naf
2-digit
Dln(average size of other plants,
same industry–area + 1)
0.060b 0.027 0.049b
(0.024) (0.020) (0.022)
Dln(# other plants, same
industry–area + 1)
0.035 0.030 0.074
(0.117) (0.083) (0.138)
Dln(# employees, other
industries, same area)
0.029 0.233 0.265
(0.174) (0.162) (0.234)
N 126,794 126,786 129,521
# plants 29,514 29,512 30,078
R2 0.0006 0.0005 0.0006
Kleinbergen–Paap test 8.333 19.831 4.462
Hansen overidentiﬁcation test p-value 0.893 0.681 0.184
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are GMM, with Moulton
standard errors. R2 are computed as the squared correlation between the predicted
and actual values of the dependent variable.
a Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
b Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
c Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
17 In related work, Henderson (2003) and Rosenthal and Strange (2003), Rosenthal
and Strange (2010) also ﬁnd that small ﬁrms beneﬁt more and generate more
agglomeration economies.
18 Hymel (2009) shows for example that trafﬁc congestion reduces employment
growth in US metropolitan areas.
19 The theory does not tell us much on the exact form of the relation. We show the
speciﬁcation with quadratic and cubic terms because it produces the best ﬁt.
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those ﬁrms, the allocation rule of value-added and capital among
plants of a given ﬁrm does not play any role. We further show
the results when regressions are run at the ﬁrm-level, and not at
the plant-level, ﬁrm-level localization economies variable being
calculated as the log of a weighted average or as the weighted
average of the log of plant-level localization economies variable.
In all cases, Table 11 shows statistical signiﬁcance for all three
terms of localization economies (the Sargan–Hansen test being
slightly low at the plant-level).
We present the results for single-plant ﬁrms and for plants in
Figs. 1 and 2. The dark curve is the estimate of the TFP surplus gain
for each level of the localization variable (computed with the esti-
mated coefﬁcients). The net effect of localization economies has
the same form in both cases: an inverted U-shape pattern. The
net TFP surplus due to localization economies is however negative
for small values of the localization variable.
We now proceed to a quantitative analysis on single-plant
ﬁrms, since it is for those ﬁrms that our estimation is less noisy.
At the département/Naf 3-digit level, the threshold for which the
gains from clusters become positive is around 40–45 employees.
Remember this does not include the workers of the plant/ﬁrm
itself. The second threshold for which the negative effect of clusters
dominates the positive effect is around 9500 employees. This con-
ﬁrms the existence of non-linear effects of localization economies
on productivity and suggests that clustering beneﬁts and conges-
tion effects vary in relative strength depending on the size of the
cluster. One possible way to rationalize what we ﬁnd is the
following. At low levels of clustering, and therefore with a small
number of plants, the labor poaching argument of Combes and
Duranton (2006) where strategic interactions of ﬁrms are key, may
be at play and may dominate the other effects. When the cluster
is large enough, localization effects dominate. However, when pushed
too far, clustering generates congestion effects that dominate
localization effects.
The peak, at which the marginal congestion effects of increasing
the number of workers in the same département and the same sec-
tor start to dominate the localization effects, is estimated at more
or less 1000 employees.
On the same graph we plot with the grey curve the actual dis-
tribution of the localization economies variable for French plants
Table 10
Size heterogeneity.
Dep. var.: Dln Levinsohn–Petrin TFP
Model Dép./Naf 3-
digit 6 avg size
Dép./Naf 3-
digit > avg size
EA/Naf 3-
digit 6 avg size
EA/Naf 3-
digit > avg size
EA/Naf 2-
digit 6 avg size
EA/Naf 2-
digit > avg size
Dln(# employees, other plants, same
industry–area + 1)
0.050c 0.042 0.033b 0.003 0.050c 0.035
(0.029) (0.057) (0.016) (0.029) (0.029) (0.055)
Dln(# employees, other industries, same
area)
0.036 0.419 0.126 0.769b 0.119 0.859b
(0.163) (0.299) (0.183) (0.328) (0.224) (0.361)
N 94,879 31,915 94,879 31,907 96,989 32,532
# plants 22,835 6679 22,835 6677 23,287 6791
R2 0.0007 0.001 0.0004 0.0004 0.0007 0.0003
Kleinbergen–Paap test 47.120 20.514 57.332 46.104 19.772 21.503
Hansen overidentiﬁcation test p-value 0.493 0.025 0.489 0.151 0.669 0.147
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are GMM, with Moulton standard errors. R2 are computed as the squared correlation between the predicted and actual
values of the dependent variable.
a Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
b Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
c Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
Table 11
Bell-shaped curve Département-Naf 3-digit.
Dep. var.: Dln Levinsohn–Petrin TFP
Model (1) Plants (2) Single plant ﬁrms (3) Firms (4) Firms
Dln(# employees, other ﬁrms, same industry–area + 1) 0.256a 0.298a 0.227a 0.223a
(0.088) (0.114) (0.080) (0.078)
Dln(# employees, other ﬁrms, same industry–area + 1)2 0.086b 0.113b 0.076a 0.074b
(0.034) (0.044) (0.029) (0.029)
Dln(# employees, other ﬁrms, same industry–area + 1)3 0.006c 0.009b 0.005b 0.005c
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
Dln(# employees, other industries, same area) 0.046 0.144 0.051 0.044
(0.184) (0.238) (0.145) (0.149)
N 126,794 63,675 95,077 95,077
# plants 29,514 15,221 20,479 20,479
R2 0.0005 0.0002 0.0005 0.0004
Kleinbergen–Paap test 7.829 6.832 12.329 14.443
Hansen overidentiﬁcation test p-value 0.047 0.692 0.311 0.366
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are GMM, with Moulton standard errors. Column (1) presents regressions with TFP calculated at the plant-level, column
(2) with TFP computed at the ﬁrm-level for single-plant ﬁrms only. Column (3) presents results at the ﬁrm-level, agglomeration at the ﬁrm-level being calculated as the log of
the weighted average of plant-level environment, using plant-shares in ﬁrm-level employment as weights. Column (4) presents results at the ﬁrm-level, agglomeration at the
ﬁrm-level being calculated as the the weighted average of the log of plant-level environment, using plant-shares in ﬁrm-level employment as weights. R2 are computed as the
squared correlation between the predicted and actual values of the dependent variable.
a Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
b Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
c Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
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present in the sample. The peak of the distribution is obtained for
plants located in départements that have around 1150 employees
in the same sector (again excluding the workers of the plant itself).
The productivity gain for a plant that would go from the observed
peak to the estimated peak is very small, only 0.001%. This does not
mean however that all plants are located optimally. If it were the
case, we would not be able to estimate the bell-shaped curve. For
example, a plant corresponding to the ﬁrst decile in terms of local-
ization economies variable (76 employees) that would move to the
estimated peak would experience a productivity gain of around
37.9%. This gain would be around 10.5% for plants at the ﬁrst quar-
tile, 0.005% for the median plant, 2.2% for a plant at the third quar-
tile and 12.8% for a plant at the last decile of the distribution of the
localization economies variable.
Consequently, the comparison of the two curves suggests that
French single-plant ﬁrms do internalize to a large extent the
short-run productivity gains of clustering when making location
choices. Another way to see this is that very few plants locate in
areas for which the TFP surplus that comes from localization is
negative (6.3% of the observations in our sample). Note that these
results are average results and that they are obtained assuming
that all sectors are equally sensitive to localization economies. A
more disaggregated analysis is here impossible because of the
insufﬁcient number of observations for some sectors. The results
are less striking for the plants of the whole set of ﬁrms but still
comparable (see Fig. 2). This result is qualitatively robust for
different levels of sectoral and geographic aggregation and for
OLS TFP index.
Our estimation enables us to perform the following thought
experiment. Think of a single-plant ﬁrm (with its time-invariant
idiosyncratic characteristics and for a given level of employment
and capital) that has to choose its location among many départe-
ments. Strictly speaking, this ﬁrm should be small enough so that
its location choice does not matter for other ﬁrms. Relocating from
a département with no other workers in its own sector to a départ-
ement with 1150 employees in its own sector (the peak of the ob-
served distribution), generates an estimated large TFP gain of
53.8%. The same gain would be obtained when a ﬁrm relocates
from an over-crowded area (with 9500 employees in the same sec-
tor) to the observed peak of the distribution. This suggests that
clusters are a natural implication of ﬁrms maximizing proﬁts,20
but that larger clusters are not always better, at least in the short-
run, keeping local infrastructures and all the other local determi-
nants of productivity constant. Hence, one should not conclude from
our study that geography does not matter for ﬁrms. It matters a lot
and ﬁrms are aware of it.
6. Conclusion
We have shown that, once taking into account several possible
sources of bias, agglomeration externalities in France take the form
of localization economies in the short-run. This does not mean that
urbanization economies are not important but our results suggest
that they may be more a long-run phenomenon. A question re-
mains unanswered: who beneﬁts from these short-run productiv-
ity gains linked to localization economies?Workers, capital owners
or land owners? According to Combes et al. (2008a), the elasticity
of wages to employment’s area specialization, on French data, is
around 2.1%. Even though the methodology, data and classiﬁca-
tions are not strictly comparable, the returns of localization econ-
omies would be inferior for wages than those estimated for TFP in
our paper, which range between 5% and 10%. This suggests that
workers do not capture fully the gains from localization economies.
We also tried to analyze the effect of localization externalities on
proﬁts but did not ﬁnd any conclusive result. This suggests that a
large part of the surplus is captured by the immobile factor, namely
land,21 which would be consistent with theory. At this point how-
ever, this hypothesis, while plausible, would need further
investigation.
Our results have several interesting policy implications in a
context in which cluster policies are popular among governments
and local authorities. First, the starting point of those who favor
cluster policies is right: clusters bring productivity gains in the
short-run. However, our results suggest that those gains are well
internalized in the location decisions of ﬁrms. Consequently, the
gains we can expect from more policy-induced clustering are, at
least in the short-run, relatively small. The comparison between
an estimated geographical distribution of plants that would maxi-
mize productivity and the one that is actually observed suggests no
large gap, at least in the French case. It points neither to a situation
where geography is too concentrated/specialized nor to a geogra-
phy that needs more clustering. This result is ‘‘only’’ about produc-
tivity and is not about welfare which agglomeration could affect
through other channels than through productivity. However, our
results suggest that even though the starting point of cluster policy
advocates is right, the next step of the argument – advocating for
Fig. 1. Localization economies for single-plant ﬁrms – Département/Naf 3-digit.
Fig. 2. Localization economies for plants – Département/Naf 3-digit.
20 This is consistent with the results of Crozet et al. (2004) who ﬁnd that a very
important determinant of location choice in France for multinational ﬁrms is the
localization variable.
21 This is indeed what Arzaghi and Henderson (2008) ﬁnd in their study of clusters
in advertising in New York city. In different contexts, Gautier et al. (2009) and Pope
(2008) show clearly that land and housing prices are very responsive to shocks
affecting the desirability of a given place.
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Table 12
Between/within heterogeneity.
Mean Std. deviation
ln(value-added) Overall 7.79 1.09
Between 1.09
Within 0.23
ln(employees) Overall 4.01 0.93
Between 0.93
Within 0.14
ln(capital) Overall 7.51 1.51
Between 1.54
Within 0.22
ln(Levinsohn–Petrin TFP) Overall 3.41 0.59
Between 1.54
Within 0.22
ln(# employees, other plants,
same industry–area + 1)
Overall 6.32 1.90
Between 0.60
Within 0.19
ln(# employees, other industries,
same area + 1)
Overall 10.43 0.76
Between 0.75
Within 0.04
Note: Number of observations: 126,794 in all rows. All variables are in logarithm
and the sample is the one used for GMM regressions at the Département/Naf 3-digit
level.
Table 13
First-stage regressions-online appendix.
Dep. var Dln (# employees,
other ﬁrms, same
industry–area + 1)
Dln(# employees,
other industries,
same area)
ln(# employees, other ﬁrms, same
industry–area + 1)t2
0.029a 0.000
(0.002) (0.000)
ln(# employees, other industries,
same area)t2
0.005b 0.008a
(0.002) (0.001)
ln(# other ﬁrms, same
industry–area + 1)t2
0.032a 0.001
(0.003) (0.001)
N 126,794 126,794
# plants 29,514 29,514
R2 0.01 0.223
F-stat 69.72 123.53
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. cSigniﬁcance at the 10% level. Standard errors
are corrected to take into account correlation of errors at the area–industry–year
level.
a Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
b Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
Table 15
Instrumental variables approach.
Dep. var.: Dln Levinsohn–Petrin TFP
Dép./Naf
3-digit
EA/Naf
3-digit
Dép./Naf
2-digit
EA/Naf
2-digit
Dln(# employees, other ﬁrms,
same industry–area + 1)
0.059b 0.028c 0.283b 0.055b
(0.028) (0.015) (0.126) (0.027)
Dln(# employees, other
industries, same area)
0.060 0.245 0.303 0.294
(0.149) (0.168) (0.255) (0.209)
N 126,794 126,786 129,529 129,521
# Plants 29,514 29,512 30,080 30,078
R2 0.0006 0.0005 0.0003 0.0005
Kleinbergen–Paap test 60.581 71.007 7.996 28.680
Hansen overidentiﬁcation test
p-value
0.402 0.679 0.083 0.192
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. aSigniﬁcance at the 1% level. All regressions
are GMM, with Moulton standard errors. R2 are computed as the squared correla-
tion between the predicted and actual values of the dependent variable.
b Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
c Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
Table 16
Instrumental variables approach.
Dep. var.: Dln Levinsohn–Petrin TFP
Dép./Naf
3-digit
EA/Naf
3-digit
Dép./Naf
2-digit
EA/Naf
2-digit
Dln(# employees, other ﬁrms,
same industry–area + 1)
0.055c 0.020 0.219c 0.055b
(0.029) (0.017) (0.116) (0.027)
Dln(# employees, other
industries, same area)
0.005 0.136 0.031 0.202
(0.206) (0.252) (0.339) (0.247)
Dln(sectoral diversity) 0.056 0.077 0.495c 0.079
(0.130) (0.130) (0.299) (0.145)
Dln(competition) 0.057 0.064 0.004 0.004
(0.047) (0.052) (0.061) (0.056)
N 126,794 126,786 129,529 129,521
R2 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 0.0006
Kleinbergen–Paap test 15.158 9.313 2.401 5.828
# Plants 29,514 29,512 30,080 30,078
Hansen overidentiﬁcation test
p-value
0.130 0.223 0.306 0.127
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are GMM, with Moulton
standard errors. R2 are computed as the squared correlation between the predicted
and actual values of the dependent variable.
a Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
b Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
c Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
Table 14
First stage regressions-online appendix.
Dep. var. Dln (# employees, other ﬁrms,
same industry–area + 1)
Dln(# employees, other industries,
same area)
Dln sectoral diversity
Dln competition
ln(# employees, other ﬁrms, same industry–area + 1)t2 0.032a 0.000 0.003a 0.004a
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
ln(# employees, other industries, same area)t2 0.008a 0.007a 0.002c 0.003
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
ln(# other ﬁrms, same industry–area + 1)t2 0.052a 0.000 0.013a 0.031a
(0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004)
ln sectoral diversityt2 0.006 0.002a 0.017a 0.006c
(0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
ln competitiont2 0.020a 0.000 0.007a 0.044a
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
N 126,794 126,794 126,794 126,794
# Plants 29,514 29,514 29,514 29,514
R2 0.01 0.224 0.052 0.018
F-stat 42.88 85.40 70.30 37.26
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
a Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
b Signiﬁcance at the 5% level. Standard errors are corrected to take into account correlation of errors at the area–industry–year level.
c Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
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costly public intervention in favor of clusters – is not supported by
the French evidence. In a related paper, Martin et al. (2009), using
the same dataset as in this paper, we ﬁnd no evidence that a French
cluster policy, the ‘‘Systèmes Productifs Locaux’’, had any effect on
ﬁrms’ productivity.
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